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As regional trading arrangements (RTAs) have spread, enlarged and deepened over the last
decade, they have posed challenges to economists on both intellectual and policy levels. On the
former, do RTAs stimulate growth and investment,  facilitate technology transfer, shift comparative
advantage towards high value-added activities, provide credibility to reform programs, or induce
political stability and cooperation? Or do they, on the other hand, divert trade in inefficient
directions and undermine the multilateral trading system?
The answer is probably "all of these things, in different proportions according to the
particular circumstances of each RTA." This then poses the policy challenge of how best to
manage RTAs in order to get the best balance of benefits and costs. For example, should technical
standards be harmonized and, if so, how; do direct or indirect  taxes need to be equalized; how
should RTAs manage their international  trade policies in an outward-looking  fashion?
Addressing these issues is one important focus of the research program of the International
Trade Division of the World Bank. It has produced a number of methodological innovations in the
traditional area of trade effects of RTAs and is now starting to tackle four new areas of research: the
dynamics of regionalism (e.g., convergence, growth, investment, industrial location and migration),
deep integration (standards, tax harmonization), regionalism and the rest of the world (including its
effects on the multilateral trading system), and certain political economy dimensions of regionalism
(e.g., credibility and the use of RTAs as tools of diplomacy).
In addition to thematic work, the program includes a number of studies of specific regional
arrangements, conducted in collaboration with the Regional Vice Presidencies of the Bank.  Several
EU-Mediterranean Association Agreements have been studied and a joint program with the staff of
the Latin American and Caribbean Region entitled "Making the Most of Mercosur"  is under way.
Future work is planned on African and Asian regional integration schemes.
Regionalism and Development findings have been and will, in future, be released in a
number of outlets. Recent World Bank Policy Research Working Papers concerning these issues
include:
Glenn Harrison, Tom Rutherford and David Tarr, "Economic Implications for Turkey
of a Customs Union with the European Union," (No. 1599).
Maurice Schiff, "Small is Beautiful, Preferential Trade Agreements and the Impact of
Country Size, Market Share, Efficiency and Trade Policy," (No. 1668).
L. Alan Winters, "Regionalism versus Multilateralism," (No. 1687).
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Maurice Schiff and L. Alan Winters, "Regional Integration  as Diplomacy"Magnus Blomstrom and Ari Kokko, "How Foreign Investment Affects Host Countries"
(WPS1745, March 1997)
Magnus Blomstr6m and Ari Kokko, "Regional Integration and Foreign Direct
Investment: A Conceptual Framework and Three Cases"
Anthony Venables and Diego Puga, "Trading Arrangements and Industrial
Development"
Glenn Harrison, Thomas Rutherford and David Tarr, "Trade Policy Options for Chile:
A Quantitative Evaluation"
In addition, Making the Most of Mercosur will be issuing papers over the next few months,
including:
Alexander J. Yeats, "Does Mercosur's Trade Performance Raise Concerns About the
Effects of Regional Trade Arrangements?" (WPS  1729, February 1997))
Azita Amjadi and L. Alan Winters, "Transport Costs and 'Natural' Integration in
Mercosur" (WPS 1742, March 1997)
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Exports in Mercosur"
Malcom Rowat, "Competition Policy within Mercosur"
For copies of these papers or information about these programs contact Maurice Schiff, The
World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20433.
An additional major outlet for World Bank-sponsored  research on regionalism will be the
Annual Bank Conference on Development in Latin America, 1997, Montevideo, June 30-July 2,
1997, organized by the Office of the Chief Economist and the Technical Department for Latin




International Economics Department1.  Introduction
This paper attempts, for the first time we believe,  to trace the effects of creating  a
regional  trading arrangement  on export and import prices. We commence  by observing
that it has long been  known  theoretically  that preferential  integration  is likely  to affect the
terms of trade -- e.g., Mundell (1964) -- and by noting that the terms of trade are the most
direct way in which regionalism  affects non-partner countries.  Indeed, the traditional
method of assessing  third country  effects  by examining  whether the bloc imports more or
less of the latter's exports is deeply  flawed, and we view the present exercise  as a step
towards developing  more satisfactory  methods.
Section  2 sets out the background  on the price effects  of regional  integration  more
filly.  We then initiate an empirical test to  determine, in one particular instance of
integration,  whether these effects can actually be identified.  This begins in Section 3
which lays out a simple  model  of Bertrand  competitors  selling  in a market which starts to
offer one of them preferentially  reduced  tariffs. The prediction,  not surprisingly,  is that the
preferred  exporter  will normally  raise its pre-tariff  price, while  non-preferred  one drops its,
although  this outcome  is not completely  inevitable.  The model  suggests  that the effects  of
tariff changes  are the same as those of changes in the costs of production and exchange
rates in the exporting  market. This is empirically  useful  because it allows  us a far stronger
empirical  base for identifying  the effects  we postulate.
Section  4 gives details  of the instance  of regional  integration  we examine  and the
reasons for choosing it:  we explore the effect of Spanish accession  to  the European
Communities  in 1986 on the prices of Spanish  imports  of finished  manufactures  from the
United States, Japan, France, West Germany,  Italy and the United Kingdom. Although
2this is obviously  only half of the terms of trade story, it seems an obvious place to start
looking  for price effects: the Spanish  market is large'enough  to be worth competing  for,
differentiated products like  finished manufactures offer  the  most  likely locus  for
oligopolistic  pricing, and the partners chosen are the  main suppliers, at  least in the
engineering  sectors. The exercise  is conducted  on the most detailed  data available  to us -
goods defined  at the 5-digit  level  of the SITC(R).
Section 5 reports some results.  After ruling out various 5-digit trade flows for
data reasons or because of the presence of confounding  policies,  we have a sample of
approximately  160 goods.  The unit value series, which proxy import prices, are very
noisy and the tariff aggregates  rather crude.  As a consequence  it proves quite hard to
extract information  from the data.  We concentrate  on the relative  prices of partner (i.e.,
EC) and non-partner  sales to Spain,  in the same way as the traditional  assessments  of the
effects  of regionalism  are based on relative  quantities  or values of trade -- i.e., on import
shares. Our estimates  suggest that the relative  tariff-inclusive  prices of U.S. and Japanese
sales in Spain  relative  to those of various  EC suppliers  respond  to changes  in relative  costs
and tariffs between  member  and non-member  countries  with an elasticity  of 0.41-0.81 for
the U.S. and 0.62-0.89  for Japan. This implies  that, ceteris  paribus,  a tariff preference  of,
say, ten percentage points offered  to EC suppliers  causes the U.S. and Japan pre-tariff
prices to  fall relative to  EC  pre-tariff prices by  approximately 2-6%,  and  1-4%
respectively.  If this were manifest  in a fall in the U.S. prices relative  to the no-preference
situation it would imply significant  welfare losses for the United States on its sales to
Spain. In fact, of course, at least part of the relative  price change  reflects increases  in EC
3supply prices, and to that extent the U.S. and Japan losses are relative only to a situation
in which they also received the tariff reduction.
Identifying the  terms  of trade  effects  should be  an  important  element  in  any
economic assessment of regional trading arrangements, both for the distribution of gains
among partner and for identifying  the consequences on the rest of the world.  Our results
are, we believe, the first ever and are subject to a number of qualifications. However, they
do suggest that such studies are feasible and that we can investigate the effects of regional
integration on the rest of the world in a more direct and theoretically acceptable way than
has been done heretofore.
2.  Integration and the terms of trade
Perhaps the most  central prediction of customs union  theory is that  entering  a
preferential trade arrangement alters a county's  terms of trade.  On the import side, this
can occur in a simple Vinerian model through trade diversion; dearer supplies from partner
countries (dearer  in a  national, pre-tariff,  sense)  displace cheaper  supplies  from  non-
partners and thus raise the average price of imports.  In more sophisticated models with
either increasing costs or differentiated products it occurs as increased demand for partner
products,  either  created or  diverted, raises their  prices, while the  opposite  occurs  for
imports from non-partner.  Figure  1 illustrates the simplest case.  It refers to  the market
for an import supplied by two exporters, both subject to increasing cost (of supplying that
market) and both subject to a tariff.  When both face tariffs, total  supply is the horizontal
sum of the individual tariff-inclusive supply curves SN(t), for non-partners, and Sp(t), for
partners, viz., STOT(MFN).  When the partner is exempted from the tariff, the total supply
4curve becomes the sum of SN(t)  and Sp, viz., STOT(CU),  and the internal price falls from po
to pi.  For the partner country, the price received rises from po' to p'  for it faces no tariff
in the custom union.  For the non-partner, on the other hand, the price received falls from
po' to pl',  as demand for its tariff-ridden sales contracts.
On the export side, the story is more complicated but is still potentially important.
Export prices to partner countries are likely to increase as exporters appropriate some or
all  of  what  was  previously tariff  revenue;  those  to  non-partners  might  rise  or  fall
depending on their substitutability in production for partner-bound exports; if integration
has major effects on market  structure -- for  example, dramatically increasing levels of
competition (Gasiorek, Smith and Venables, 1992) -- costs could fall sufficiently to bring
all export prices down.
Clearly terms of trade  effects are likely to  figure significantly in the net welfare
effects of a customs union or free trade area and also in their distribution across members.
Perhaps more significantly, however, the terms of trade  are the principal route through
which integration schemes affect the rest of the world.  We have argued in Winters (1996,
1997) that the usual approach to measuring this latter effect is deeply flawed: it entails
asking whether non-members' shares of member countries'  total  imports have increased
and  equating  increases with  improvements in  non-member  welfare  --  e.g.,  McMillan
(1993) and IMF (1994).  This is essentially a mercantilist calculus which, at face value,
equates increases in welfare with giving away more goods!  Of course, proponents of such
a view argue, non-member exports are not given away but are sold for increased imports
which raise non-member welfare directly. This is true, but as Winters (1997) shows, even
in the simplest of models, the link from exports to welfare is indirect and not monotonic.
5The two measures which do show a direct, necessary and sufficient connection to  non-
member welfare are non-member imports and non-member terms of trade,'  and it is these
that should be the focus of our measurement efforts. 2
The effects of regional integration schemes on the terms of trade have not  been
entirely neglected.  In  an  insightful, but  largely unrecognized,  article Mundell (1964)
showed that,  in  a  standard three-country model, if A  and B  offer  each other  mutual
preferences, their joint terms of trade  vis-a-vis the rest  of the world  (C) will improve.
That is, the rest of the world will suffer. Petith (1977) uses Mundell's approach in a crude
quantification of various instances of European integration, using essentially a very early
and simple computable general equilibrium model.  This is an ex ante study, drawing on no
actual terms of trade  data from the integration period.  Similarly, Kreinin and Plummer
(1992), assessing the effects of the European Communities' Second Enlargement and the
formation  of NAFTA, predict  rather than measure the terms of trade  effects on  non-
member countries.
More  recent  computable  general  equilibrium  models  have  also  generated
predictions  about the  terms  of  trade.  Most  notably,  in  discussing Europe's  "1992"
exercise, Gasiorek,  Smith and Venables (1992) identify the welfare effects for European
countries  of prospective  changes in  both  export and  import  prices:  interestingly they
I Anderson  and Snape  (1994)  also  observe  the importance  of terms of trade improvements.
2 Winters  (1997) also  observes  that, contrary  to common  usage,  the discussion  of non-member  welfare  has
virtually no connection  with the Kemp-Wan  Theorem--Kemp  and Wan (1976). Kemp  and Wan  discussed
only  the case in which the customs  union chooses  its external tariff to leave  the prices  and quantities  of all
non-members'  trade unchanged  and hence  to leave non-members  indifferent  to the integration
arrangements.  They  made  no comment  on  the  desirability  or otherwise  of  any  deviations  from  that
position.
6estimate quite significant declines in the EU's terms of trade (improvements in the rest of
the world's  terms of trade) as efficiency gains work through to  export prices.  Several
papers in Francois and  Shiells (1994) estimate the effects of NAFTA on the  partners'
terms of trade.
In the light of its theoretical importance it seems surprising that  (as far  as we
know) there is no existing ex post study of the terms of trade effects, or even of the price
effects, of regional integration.  This paper attempts to start to put this situation right.  It
examines whether Spanish accession to the EC led to detectable changes in the prices of
Spanish imports.  This is obviously not sufficient to inform us about the terms of trade
effects, but it seems a sensible place to start, given the theoretical results that exist.
3.  A simDle model
Although  the notion that  regional integration affects the  prices in  international
trade requires no further justification, it is useful to examine more formally what form that
relationship might take.  We  start with  the  simplest of models which might  generate
import  price  effects  from  a  regional  integration  arrangement.  We  assume  that  the
importing country (in our case below, Spain) imports a good from two sources and that it
alters the tariff on one of those sources.  The two sources supply differentiated versions of
the good and we assume that this good is separable from all other expenditure in Spain
and subject to two-stage  budgeting.  On the supply side we assume that only one firm
from  each  country  actually  exports  to  Spain  and  that  each  has  a  cost  function
homogeneous of degree one in input prices; we assume that firms behave in a Bertrand
fashion in the Spanish market and that this market is strategically separable from all others.
7Thus while sales in other markets might affect the costs of supplying Spain, there is no
attempt by firms to combine their interactions in different markets into a supergame.  Each
firm is assumed to maximize profits from Spanish sales in terms of its own currency.
The objective functions of the two  exporting firms, member (which receives the
tariff preference) and non-member, are as follows: 3
Max{4SpX(p, p,  Q) - C(x,  X)W}  (la)
PT
Max{r  Px* (p,p*,Q)-c  (x  ,X*)w*}  (lb)
where  * the stars represent the member's variables, non-stars the non-member's;
e is the exchange rate in termns  of exporter's currency units per peseta;
p is the price of sales in Spain including tariffs in peseta, we have also
a pre-tariff price  p such that p =  p (1 + t);
-t is the ad valorem tariff factor (l+t),  where t is the tariff on these exports;
x(p,p*,Q) is Spanish demand for this exporter's  products;
Q(Y,P,  P) is the volume of imports of this good into Spain -- an aggregate
of the quantities supplied by the two exporters, x and x*;
Y is Spanish total income;
P(p,p*) is the price index for Spain's total imports of the target good -- it is
homogeneous of degree 1 in the individual  prices;
P is an aggregate of all other Spanish prices;
The  formalities  of  this model  are  quite  close  to those  of  Feenstra's  (1989).
8c(x,X) is the marginal input/output ratio for the exporter -- the number of
composite factor units required to deliver one unit of exports to
Spain;
X is all other output by the exporting firm; and
w is the price of the composite factor.
The variables for the member country are defined analogously.
We treat all variables as non-stochastic and re-express the demand function in a
form that combines both the partial price effect holding aggregate imports constant and
the  effect that  arises as  changes in  individual prices affect, the  aggregate import  price
index, viz., x =x(p,p*,Y,  P).
The  first-order  conditions  are  straightforward  for  non-member  and  member
respectively,
nK2  > Y  P)-P  (I  +  Z)  (2a)
(p, p*, Y, P)=-p*t  I+-  = z*c  (2b)
where  z  -- =  (+t)w
e  e
,n = px p/x, the ordinary partial price elasticity of demand (also the
appropriate "perceived" elasticity for Bertrand competitors); and
m(p,p*,Y,  P) is the marginal revenue function.
Equations (2a) and (2b) solve respectively to linear homogeneous functions
p = 7C(z,,p*,Y,  P)  (3a)
9p*= 7*(z*,p,Y,  P)  (3b)
from which we calculate the effects on the export price of a change in the exporter's costs
(w), exchange rate (e), tariff (t) or other output (X), and of a change in the competitor's
price (including the effects of the tariffs on it).
Total differentiation of (2a) with respect to p, p*, z and (2b) with respect to p, and
p* yields the following equation which must be solved to obtain the comparative statistics
analysis of a shock to non-member country's costs, z.
dp z
0  7  _Y  l  )  )  dz p  (4)
9*r  - ay  - 17*y  )  dp* z  (0J
dz  p
where  0 _n-*P  , is the elasticity of marginal revenue with respect to price,
,P  m
y  dc  x,,  *  ,  _  _  is the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to
the quantity of exports.
O8=  , * - is the cross-elasticity of demand; and
x
,l9  = +*  *  P  is the elasticity of the target country's marginal revenue
with respect to the rival's price.
The sign of the elasticity of marginal revenue with respect to price, 0, depends only
on the way in which the elasticity of demand evolves along the demand curve.  Recalling
that m = p(l+r-f 1)
109=n=p  m2q 2 (5)
4@ m  m71
>1  if  <°
< 1  if  qp > 0
Thus, for example, an isoelastic  demand curve generates 0 =  1, while a linear
demand curve, along which the absolute  value of the elasticity  rises with price (ip  <  0),
gives  0 > 1. As long as the demand  curve  is not "too" convex,  9 > 1.4
The elasticity  of marginal costs (y) takes the sign of c,, that is, it depends on
whether  marginal  costs increase  or decrease  with scale. The cross-elasticity  of demand  6,
is assumed  to be positive  since  the two varieties  in question  are taken to be substitutes.
One  would normally  expect ,B  < 0; that is, holding  own-price  constant,  an increase
in the rival's price reduces  the returns  to selling  one extra unit.
Solving  equation  (4) gives  the following:
*dp z  (9* - 77*Y*)  (6a)
dzp  (9-  7Y)(9  -Y 717)  - (I-  5)(  -Y)
d  z  P  (*  )-,8)  (6b)
dz  p  (91- 17y)(*  - **)(/J8  6~1)(/  - 9*r)
While equations  (6) define  the responses  of prices to changes  in tariffs in a fairly
general context,  the estimation  of these responses  requires  more structure. Assuming  that
4Since  np  =  pp +  P-  P,  it requires  the demand  curve  to be sufficiently  convex  for ll,> 0, which
X  X  x2
we will consider  to be unlikely  in our  analysis.
11the various elasticities  are constant,  we can use (3) to define  (locally)  the price functions
(3a) and (3b) separately  as:
Inp=K+Alnz+Blnp*+ClnY+Dln  P  (7a)
lnp*=K*+A*lnz*+B*lnp+C*lnY+D*ln  P  (7b)
Ideally  one would estimate  (7) directly,  instrumenting  In Y and In P since  the major shock
to Spanish  import  prices -- accession  to the EC -- probably  affected  aggregate  prices and
incomes as well.  We chose not to do this initially  for a number  of reasons. First, it is
useful to start with simpler  and more direct methods in order to understand better the
descriptive  features of the data.  Secondly,  at least intuitively  our actual method seems
better able to  isolate the effects we postulate.  Third, it was not clear how best to
instrument Y and P.  Fourth, it is obvious that system (7) should really have more
equations since there are more sources of  imports; deriving suitable cross-equation
constraints  in order not to overload  our inadequate  data is rather complex,  and so is left
for a later occasion.
We  proceed, therefore, by  considering a  reduced form version of  (7)  and
simplifying  it by appealing  to the assumptions  made  above.  Separability and  two-stage
budgeting imply  that the allocation  of total demand for the target good across the two
varieties  x and  x* is homothetic. It depends  only on relative  prices,  so that, in turn, p/p* is
independent  of the aggregate  demand  or its determinants. Thus by focusing  on the ratio
of prices (difference  in logs) we can elimninate  the terms in Y and P and, if they had been
included,  those in other varieties'  prices. Our estimating  equation  is therefore
In p-In  p*= a + b In z- b* In z*  (8)
12where  the coefficients  a = constant,  b, and b* are defined  below.
To interpret equation (8), suppose that there is an increase in tariffs on non-
members,  i.e., dr > 0. Recalling  that p =,r)5 and that z = X (w/e),  (8) can be written in the
form In p  -In p-  = (b - 1) In  T - (b* - 1) In Xo....  Thus if b = I the change in the pre-
tariff price of the member  is exactly  equal to that of the non-member. If b <  1 the
member's  pre-tariff  price rise is smaller  than that of the non-member,  whereas  if b > I then
the opposite  is true. We will show  that all three cases  are possible.
The final step is to define and interpret  the coefficients  b and b* in terms of the
elasticities  above. Subtracting  (6a) from (6b)
dpzdp*z  dIn(p)  (*  - ?*Y*)y (9*y*-*)
dz p  dz  p  dlnz  (a-  17y)(S - v r  )-(gy  -0(9  Y  4  )
=____  -P__  )  *(_  1 )  (9a)
_y___)  9*7*  fl8*  'IIeqr
@-v  @-  7-A 
We can also define  the symmetric  effect on the relative  price given a shock to the costs of
members,
d  p  n(  (r -e  - (i-(9-)7r)
dlnz  - (9  9)(  - *)*)Q5a  fl(6Y  fl)
Examination  of (9a) shows that there are two forces at work.  It is easy to show
that the second term is just the shift in price as non-member  costs (tariffs) increase
ignoring  any interaction  effects. The likely  conditions  that 0 > 1 and y > 0 restrict this to
lie between  zero and one. The first term of (9a) captures the interaction  between the two
13firms.  Figure  2(A) describes graphically what  happens when  an  increase in  the non-
member's tariff shifts its reaction function by (0 - ry)-y  from rf 1 to rf2, e.g., from point L to
M.  For convenience we define units such that p = p  = 1, so that the ray from the origin
to  the initial equilibrium is the 45° line.  The sign of the coefficient b is determined by
whether the new equilibrium, N, lies above or below this ray.  Stability of the Bertrand
game requires that  (V  )-  - <  1 which we henceforth assume.  If we then
K 6-  77)K  - 77Y)
assume that both  _  and  ()  < 1,  it is clear that  b  <  1:  by the  last
assumption the interactive term is < 1, and we have already argued that normally the shift
term < 1.  We will suppose that this is the normal case and we have represented  it in
Figure 2(A).  Figure 2(B) shows that b > 1 is also possible even with stability if ( e  )
>  1 (and if the shift is close enough to unity).  Finally, figure 2(C) shows the case when b
<O, which is obtained with stability when (  > 1.
We illustrate these results in a particularly simple case with constant costs (c,.  =
0), which implies that y  0  O, and isoelastic demand ('rjp  = 0), which implies that  0  =  1.
Equation (9a) reduces to (1 + ,B*)  / (i  - J313*),  whose sign depends only on the elasticity of
marginal revenue with respect to the rival's price.  In this case if the member country's
marginal revenue were insensitive to the rival's price (f3*  =  0)  then the difference in price
between non-member and member would change just by the shock in non-member costs.
As the member country's  marginal revenue becomes more sensitive to  its  rival's  price
14there  would  be  greater  relative  losses for the  non-member  firm.  If the  elasticity  of
marginal revenue  with  respect  to  its  rival's  price  is  less  than  one  and  the  stability
requirement is satisfied, i.e., ,B  < 1 and ,8p* < 1.  Then it is clear that the overall effect is
less than one and therefore that a terms of trade loss occurs for non-members (Figure 2A).
If 1  > 1 and ,0*  < 1 then we get b > 1 (Figure 2B).  If 0* > 1 and  pf*  < 1, then b < O
(Figure 2C).
Finally, the fact that the price functions (3) are linear homogeneous means that (8)
should be homogeneous of degree 0, i.e., that b = b*.  We have experimented with this
constraint and find that even though  it is occasionally rejected  statistically, imposing it
never alters our conclusions materially.  On data spanning more than a decade, equations
that are not homogeneous are very uncomfortable, implying, as they do, the presence of
money illusion.
4.  The experiment and the data
One likely reason why no previous researcher has examined the price effects of
regional integration is that  doing so is empirically more complex than looking.at  trade
flows.  First, data on trade prices are generally absent, throwing one back on unit value
series.  These are very noisy, partly because prices frequently show significant variation
across transactions, partly because intra-heading composition changes introduce spurious
fluctuation and partly because of errors of measurement.  As one moves to finer levels of
the trade  classification composition changes become  less serious, but  underlying price
variation and measurement errors become worse because the reported data are averaged
over  fewer  transactions.  There is no  doubt that  one  should resolve this trade-off  by
15aiming for the most detailed data available, but one should be  correspondingly realistic
about how much of the variance one can explain.
The second problem is that the price changes resulting from integration are likely
to  be  small relative to  those  stemming from  other causes.  Thus while estimates that
integration  has affected trade  volumes by  30-50%  are not  uncommon  --  e.g.,  Aitken
(1973) and Winters (1987) -- one does not expect to see price changes exceeding, say, 5-
10%.  Given all the other shocks that trade prices, integration shocks are likely to be well
camouflaged in the price data.  The combination of noisy data and small impacts implies
that  one  is  likely  to  need  robust  econometric  methods  to  identify  the  effects  we
hypothesize.
We  chose  our  experiment with  the  intention  of  maximizing the  chances  of
identifying price effects, although in retrospect it is not clear that it was an ideal choice.
We examine the effects of the Spanish accession to the European Communities in 1986 on
the prices of Spanish imports of finished manufactures from major OECD sources.  These
sectors were selected as being the most likely to be subject to oligopolistic pricing -- price
effects seem more likely to  arise from imperfect competition than from upward-sloping
supply curves because the new partner is rarely likely to be large enough to induce serious
increases in  costs for  an  exporter.  These are  also the  markets for  which  our  set  of
suppliers -- the United States, Japan, France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom --
are likely to be the predominant suppliers.
Spain appeared to be a good case study in that its accession is placed reasonably
close to  the  center  of our available sample period,  1980-1993, it is large enough  that
exporters would find its market worth competing for, and it did not belong to  any free
16trade arrangement  prior to  access that would confound  the EC effect.  The problem we
face is that from the late 1970s, Spain offered EC suppliers tariff preferences  on most
goods, with discounts  of 60% and, more commonly,  25% of the MIFN  tariff.  Since the
Spanish tariff very roughly averaged 20% before accession  and the EC external tariff
averaged  roughly 5% after accession,  the margin for EC suppliers  often did not change
very much. 5 One solution  to this is to extend  the sample  back into the 1970s  to reflect the
introduction  of the preferences. However,  difficulties  over changes  in quality  (which are
important in finished  manufactures),  changes in trade classification,  small flows (which
make unit values  noisy)  and the complications  of the UK's position  during its transition  to
full  EC membership  cause  us to mistrust  the earlier  data somewhat. 6
Spain's tariff was adjusted  to EC levels over eight years following  its accession  in
1986. Thus for EC suppliers  it converged  from its 1986 starting point (including  the EC
discount)  to zero in a series  of roughly  annual  reductions  of 10-15%  of the starting tariff,
while  for non-members  it converged  on the EC common  external  tariff with the same  time
pattern,  but with the steps being applied  to the difference  between the 1986 Spanish and
EC tariffs. Thus even accession  generated  no dramatic  steps in relative  tariff levels  which
would  allow  a simple  event analysis.
The most detailed  unit value data for which  reasonable  time series  are available  are
at the 5-digit  level of the SITC(R)  from the UN's COMITRADE.  Corresponding  data on
tariffs  were taken from The  International  Customs  Journal published  by the International
5Prior  to accession  EU suppliers  received  a preference  margin of 0.25 ts, where  ts is Spain's MFN tariff;
after accession  the margin is tE,  where  tE  is the EU external  tariff. If ts k  20% and tE  - 5%/o,  which is
roughly  true of a significant  share of headings,  the preference  margin hardly changes  with accession.
6 Some  results  for 1970-1993  are given in the Appendix,  however.
17Customs Tariffs Bureau and the Protocol to the General Agreement to Tariffs and Trade,
Geneva (1979)  for  years  1970-1986 and  from  information supplied by the  Statistical
Department of the Ministry of Finance of Spain for the years 1987-1994.7  Over the first
period  the  tariff  classification  was  organized  according  to  the  Brussels  Tariff
Nomenclature (BTN) and was matched to the unit value data using the UN's  4-digit BTN
to 5-digit SITC(R) concordance.  Within each 4-digit BTN category a simple average of
the rates for individual  tariff lines was taken.  The Spanish tariff contains a "General" rate,
a "GATT" rate reflecting bindings given under the GATT, and a discounted rate for EC
suppliers.  We took  the lowest applicable of these for each heading and exporter.  After
1987 the Spanish tariff was re-organized according to the Combined Nomenclature (CN);
we matched it to  our  SITC(R) classification using a concordance provided privately by
staff  of UNCTAD,  to  whom we  are  most  grateful.  This  change  of basis  may have
redefined certain of our goods categories, and it certainly led to significant changes in the
number of tariff headings contained in each category.  Thus it may have introduced  (a
step) inaccuracy into some of our tariff series.
It  proved necessary to drop certain 5-digit SITC(R) categories from the exercise.
First, in a number of cases changes in the tariff classification significantly disturbed either
the mapping of tariff data into SITC groups or the number of tariff headings averaged
within a group.  Second, Spain offered a concessionary tariff of 5% on imports of a list of
capital goods on a year-by-year basis.  Since we could not obtain the lists for every year
7 We are most grateful  to Carlos  Martinez  Mongay  and Vincente  Isquierdo,  for help in finding  and
managing  the taLiff  data of the transition  years. We are also  grateful to Dan Gardener  of the U.S.
Department  of Commerce  for providing  us with rare copies  of The International Customs Journals.
18and did not  know the initial phase-in period for the concession, we dropped  any 5-digit
category which contained headings affected.  Third, commodities were dropped from the
exercise whenever they  suffered more than four  missing values over  the  main sample
period  of  1980-1993,  and,  finally  commodities  which  were  subject  to  quantitative
restrictions  in  1986  were  also  dropped.  These  excisions  left  us  with  samples  of
approximately 145 to  165 product categories, depending on the pairs of  countries we
examnined.
Data on the wage bill and employment, from which wages have been derived, are
taken at 2-digit level of the ISIC from the OECD's  STAN database.  Exchange rates were
also taken from the OECD's  STAN database.  The indices of industrial production from
which we derived the Capacity Utilization terms were taken at 3-digit level of the ISIC
from the UN's UNIDO database. 8 We treat all the variables mentioned in this paragraph
as exogenous in our estimation, because they refer to  substantially larger aggregations of
goods than the 5-digit price data.
5.  Results
The estimated model is: 9
In Pt  =a+b.ln(rw/e)i,  +c.InCult  +  (11
Pit  (zw / e)*,  CU  l
Capacity  Utilization  is measured  by the  deviation  of the  logarithm  of  the  appropriate  3-digit  ISIC
industry's  index  of  industrial  production  from  trend. Relative  capacity  utilization  is the  difference  of two
such  variables.
9Because costs  of  production  might  be sensitive  to aggregate  levels  of  output  we  add  to the  model,  here
and  throughout,  a term  in relative  pressure  on capacity  of the  export  industries  of the  two  countries
concerned.
19where the subscript i = (1, 2, 3, ..., n) commodities, and t = (1980, 81, 82, ..., 1993) time.
The RoW countries are represented by U.S. or Japan, and the EC (denoted by *) by one
of the four major EC exporters to  Spain, i.e., Germany, Italy, France, and the UK.  We
estimate equation (11) for every pair comprising one EC and one non-EC country.
Our first step was to  estimate (11) on each of the products  separately.  That is
effectively to index the parameters by i.  Not surprisingly, with only 14 noisy observations,
this produced a wide scatter of estimated coefficients and generated significant regressions
for only 20-40 out of 145-165 commodities depending on which country pairs were used.
The distributions of the estimates of b for each of the eight pairings of countries are given
in Figure 3 and Figure 4.  It is plain that while the estimates are concentrated in the correct
region a priori -- between 0 and 1 -- their variances across commodities are huge.  All this
suggests is that the individual commodity estimations are not precise enough for us to be
able to make useful inferences.
The weakness of the individual commodity results is disappointing and might, at
first glance, be taken  to  indicate an incorrect model.  However,  it is very difficult to
believe  that  prices  are  quite  independent  of  costs,  exchange  rates  and  tariffs  and
insignificance indicates only the  insufficiency of information to  identify the  postulated
effects, not the irrelevance of the latter.  Hence we proceed by combining the observations
on the various commodities, first comparing results across regressions and then working
with a cross-section of the time series.  10
10  The  ordering  of  the two  concepts  in this terminology  is conscious.
20Table I summarizes the estimates of b and the summary statistics for each country
pair.  The mean estimates of b are all statistically different from zero -- which would imply
that post-tariff prices were independent of costs -- and statistically different from unity --
which would imply complete pass-through of costs -- in half the cases (U.S.-Italy, U.S.-
UK, Japan-Germany, and Japan-France).  The mean for the U.S.-UK sample, for example,
is 0.65, which implies that, on average, a  1% increase in the difference in costs or tariffs
between the U.S. and UK, i.e., in relative real wages or the difference in tariff  between
member and non-member countries, will cause tariff inclusive price differential to rise by
0.65%.
We now turn to  the cross-section of time series.  Combining the unit values for
such different commodities obliges us to  include separate constants for  each product  --
product fixed effects --  and to  simplify the exercise we  conduct the  estimation on the
deviations from individual means of the variables recorded in Section 3.  We also correct
for cross-sectional heteroscedasticity by deflating the data pertaining to each commodity
by the estimated standard error from the individual estimate of  (11)  for that commodity.
From  here  on,  all  pooled  estimates  will be  corrected  for  heteroscedasticity  in  this
manner.- 1
Table  2  reports  the  estimates from  the  pooled  samples for  each  of  the  eight
country pairs.  Due to the inherent noisiness of the unit value data only between 3% and
14% of the variance of the sample is explained by the equations, but it is apparent that the
II We have far too many commodities to make it feasible to include cross-commodity correlations in a
SURE  estimate.  However,  inspection  of  the matrix  of  cross  correlations  suggests  that  they  are  generally
rather  low.
21regressions are all strongly significant statistically.  Recall that all the explanatory power
comes from the time-series dimension of the sample, the cross-commodity variation being
absorbed  by  the  product-specific  constants.  Thus,  although  the  estimates  from  the
individual  regressions  were  widely  scattered  and  the  regressions  themselves  most
frequently  insignificant, there  is enough  information when  we  take  them  together  to
identify a set of effects common to all commodities.
Block A of table 2 shows that  relative costs between member and non-member
countries do have significant effects on relative tariff inclusive prices.  To  elaborate, it
shows that the elasticities of relative prices with respect to relative costs between U.S.-
UK,  U.S.-Germany, U.S.-Italy, and U.S.-France are approximately 0.41, 0.73, 0.69, and
0.81, respectively:  if relative U.S. costs increase by 10%, then the relative tariff-inclusive
c.i.f. price of imports from the U.S. vis-a-vis the UK, Germany, Italy, and France in the
Spanish market increases by 4.1%, 7.3%, 6.9%, and 8.1% respectively.  This implies that
part of any relative cost change is absorbed by exporters rather than passed on directly to
consumers.  We get  similar results with Japan  and its  respective EC-4  members, with
elasticities of 0.89, 0.68, 0.74, and 0.62 respectively --  1% increase in J costs -- .11, .32,
.26 and .38 decline in producer prices.
These elasticities also determine the effect of relative tariff changes on  relative
prices and thus on the extent to  which producers  absorb tariff changes. The coefficients
are statistically significant from zero and, with one exception, significantly different from
unity.  The difference unity implies that,  pre-tariff and post-tariff relative prices vary in
opposite directions, a tariff reduction for an EC member country increasing its relative
22pre-tariff  export price. Alternatively  stated, an EC tariff preference  reduces  the (relative)
U.S. pre-tariff  export price.
There is no evidence  that Japan  has a smaller  pass-through  to consumer  prices  than
the U.S.; in fact the lowest coefficient  is for the U.S.-UK pair.  This result is perhaps
surprising,  given the alleged propensity  of Japanese firms to "price to market." On the
other hand,  the relative  capacity  utilization  terms are positive  and at least mildly  significant
for the U.S. pairs  whereas  they are quite insignificant  for the Japanese  bilateral  cases. This
suggests that while U.S. firms price exports according to  domestic relative demand
pressures,  Japanese  firms  are less  flexible.
The equations  in block A of Table  2 represent  our maintained  hypothesis  and they
are consistent  with the view that regional  integration  -- by affecting  relative  tariff burdens
-- affects  relative  trade prices. That is, they suggest  the conclusion  that integration  affects
the terms of trade.  We now seek to disaggregate  the relative costs terms to  identify
separately  the effect  of changes  in tariffs. Block B of Table  2 shows  the results of tests for
whether  the tariff effect  is significantly  different  from the combined  effects  of all costs, i.e.,
tariffs, wages and exchange  rate.  It reports estimates  of the following  model, where all
variables  are deviations  from means:
lnP-  = a+b,  ln i'  +b-  In(w'e)"  +(c  vIn)CUt  +,
pit  ite2*  cu;
as before i = (1,2,3...,n)  commodities,  and t = (1980,81,82,...,1993)  time.  12
12 This estimated  model  is no different  from:
(w/e)il  CU In PY = a+  (b, +  b, -1). In 1"  +  b  In (  )  +c.lni C.  + 5
YU  T'  r  2t  (wl e)  t  CU  Yt
where p5  is the pre-tariff price and pjt  = pjitrit
23None of the extra terms in tariffs is statistically significant -- indeed only one has a
t-statistic above 1.2 -- so we can conclude that tariffs have no different effect on pricing
than do other costs and that these effects are as reported in block A.  Three of the eight
tariff effects are negative -- meaning that the total effect of tariffs is less than that of costs
and the exchange rate --  and five are positive.  The latter tend to  push the total  tariff
effects above unity, which implies that preferential reductions in the tariffs faced by the EC
suppliers tended to be accompanied by reductions in their pre-tariff prices or increases in
the United States' pre-tariff prices.
The most plausible explanation we have for these (insignificant) high tariff effects
is that the tariff variables are proxying additional effects -- i.e., there are omitted variables
that are highly correlated with our tariff data.  One obvious candidate is that our sample
covers a general deepening of integration within the European economy, so that,  say, a
tariff fall of 5% on European suppliers (d In T  t  -0.05) parallels a much stronger decline
in overall trade frictions as, for example, the cost and complexity of customs procedures,
transportation,  foreign  exchange  dealings,  product  standards,  and  policy  uncertainty
declined to  more normal levels.  If these costs were previously borne by the European
suppliers, what we measure as a tariff reduction would also include a significant reduction
in other (unmeasured) costs.  The latter would reduce member pre-tariff prices directly
and, in our normal case, non-member pre-tariff prices would follow them down partially.
Note that in this case, although the ratio of non-member to member pre-tariff prices would
have risen as a result of the member's tariff preferences, non-member prices would still
have fallen absolutely.  Thus if we are right in associating declines in member tariffs with
declines in European costs, the squeeze on non-member prices absolutely is reinforced not
24mitigated.  Let  us  re-iterate,  however,  statistically the tariff  effects  are not  remotely
significantly  different from the general cost effects.  In the results based on 1970-93 - see
appendix table - the problem of "excessive" tariff effects are more marked.  However, for
the reasons noted above there are other reasons to worry about these results.
Recognizing that the unit value series are noisy and that we have a possible errors-
in-variables problems, we also experimented with slightly more robust estimation
techniques entailing data aggregation.  Because we are exploiting only the time series
variation, we need to maintain some variability in relative tariffs through time, so we re-
estimated the equations on  observations averaged over four three-year periods (1980-
1982,1983-1985, etc.) and one of two years (1992-1993).13 The resulting estimates,
produced in Table 3, tell much the same story as the basic equations.  All of the cost
coefficients again are statistically different from both zero and unity although in the case of
the Japan-UK country pair significantly  greater than unity.  Similarly,  all the tariff effects
in block B are insignificant  and display a slight tendency towards being positive.  The
R-squares are, not surprisingly, a little higher, ranging now from about 6 %-41%.  Overall,
therefore, averaging the data to try to allow for noise and errors of measurement does not
change our basic story.
So far we have treated the European suppliers as a separate and mutually
competing, but it is also worth experimenting with treating them as a single unit.  This
helps to highlight the member/non-member dichotomy that lies at the heart of this work.
To explore this question we aggregated all variables referring to the EC-4, weighting them
13 As in our previous results we have taken deviations from means and corrected for cross-sectional
heteroscedasticity of all variables.
25by their lagged  shares  in imports  (in  the commodity  concerned)  in the Spanish  market.
The import  shares  were lagged  by one period in order  to avoid  endogeneity  problems.
Thus we estimate:
=  a+ b.{hLf  +  c*  -{nCU,,  - lnC,7}+6
it  j  it  }
where l,4  is the individual  EC-4 country's share  of EC4  exports of commodity  i to Spain
and j = (Italy, France, Germany,  and UK).  Table  4 shows the results of estimates  using
the same  equations  as reported in tables 2 and 3.  The total costs coefficients  are 0.77 for
U.S.-EC-4 and 0.62 for Japan-EC-4,  and again they are significantly  different  from both
zero and unity.  Similarly,  when we tried to separate out the tariff effect we found we
could not reject the hypothesis  that the tariff effect  was the same as the main costs effect
for both Japan  and the U.S.
6.  Conclusions
Our objective  in this paper has been  to start to explore  the terms of trade effects  of
regional  economic  integration. We have  briefly  shown  why this is an appropriate  measure
of the welfare effects  of integration,  comparing  it to the many ex-post studies  which base
their conclusions  on changes  in the import shares of member  and non-member  countries.
We  have demonstrated, through the  use of  a  simple strategic model, how member
countries  might gain in their terms of trade, and non-members  lose, through preferential
26tariff lowering.  And most importantly,  we have shown that, though quite difficult,
measuring  such  price effects  of integration  is feasible.
We believe  that this is the first ex-post study of its kind and that it is a valuable
addition  to and an improvement  over, previous  ex-post studies on integration  effects on
the rest of the world.  We have used finely disaggragated  data on Spanish imports of
finished  manufactures  from its major OECD  trading partners, and despite their noisiness
have  found a consistent  story  over all of the country  pairs examined.  This shows  that non-
members,  i.e., in our case the U.S. and Japan, suffered  detectable  terms of trade losses
relative  to EC competitors  in Spanish  import  markets  for differentiated  goods.
In market  structures  where firms  have some  control over prices,  it is not surprising
that firms  'price-to-market'  and that members  reap terms of trade advantages  with respect
to non-members  when their tariffs are preferentially  lowered. Our present results do not
allow  us to identify  how this relative  change  is apportioned  between absolute increases  in
member  prices and absolute falls  in non-member  prices, but the model suggests that the
latter are very likely  to some  degree  or other. In the present  case  the magnitudes  involved
are not very large. For our sample  of finished  manufactures  the weighted  average  tariff
preference  forEC suppliers  rose from 3.04% (10.18%  - 7.14%) in 1986 to 5.20% (5.20 -
0%) in 1993.  Converting  to logarithms  and using the elasticities  from table 4(a) this
translates into a relative  price fall of 0.52% for the U.S. and 0.85% for Japan.  Even on
the most generous interpretation  (i.e., that U.S. exporters  experienced  no price fall), this
suggests  that Japanese  export prices fell by about 0.33%, and it is more likely  that there
was some  fall in U.S. prices. If the latter were 0.10%,  and if we apply  the price falls  to the
271995 volumes  of trade in manufactures,  the U.S. experiences  losses of $5.1 million  and
Japan  losses of $16.2 million,  which  are largely  transferred  to Spanish  consumers.
The terms of trade costs to non-member  countries  of Spanish  accession  to the EU
are small in the example  above, partly because they suffered  some discrimination  before
accession,  partly because EC preferences  are mostly  rather small,  and partly because the
trade flows involved  are relatively  small. What the example  suggests, however, is that
elsewhere under less favorable circumstances  the  price-reducing effects of  regional
integration  on non-members'  exports could  be significant.
Corresponding  to the relative price reductions for non-European  suppliers, are
increases  for the European  ones -- and consequent  losses  to the Spanish  exchequer. Using
the same coefficients  as previously  suggests an increase  in European suppliers'  prices of
0.42%, which  with 1995 manufactured  import volumes  from the EC-10 implies  gains of
$232.6 million.
Despite the success of our empirical  work, we recognize that this exercise is a
partial one.  There is ample space for further research,  including  on Spain's imports of
other commodities  and from other partners, changes  in her export prices to Europe and
the rest of the world, and the interaction  between domestic and import prices. There is
also ample  opportunity  to study the price effects  of other examples  of regional  economic
integration. Doing so will help us to gain a much more complete  view of the effects of
integration  on both member  and  non-member  nations.
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32Figure  3: The  distributions  of the estimates  of cost elasticity
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33Figure 4: The distributions of the estimates of cost elasticity
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34Table I Summary Statistics of Individual comodity estimates of equation (11)
In  (rw  / e)  In  CU  R-square  DW-Stat  F-signifa  a
(-rw /e)*  CU*
a
(1) U.S.-Germanv
mean  0.8512  -0.1048  0.2812  1.5357  37/162
stdevp  1.3613  4.1393  0.2098  0.5954
sd(mean)  0.1070  0.3252  0.0165  0.0468
(2) U.S.-Italv
mean  0.5698  0.5099  0.3028  2.0065  39/140
stdevp  1.3141  3.1873  0.2110  0.5686
sd(mean)  0.1111  0.2694  0.0178  0.0481
(3) U.S.-France
mean  0.9221  -0.3023  0.2934  1.9563  36/138
stdevp  1.4583  4.2429  0.2135  0.6904
sd(mean)  0.1241  0.3612  0.0182  0.0588
(4) U.S.-UK
mean  0.6450  -0.7249  0.2612  1.9496  371161
stdevp  1.9468  4.1332  0.2087  0.5659
sd(mean)  0.1534  0.3257  0.0164  0.0446
(5) Japan-Germany
mean  0.4607  -0.2175  0.2810  1.8265  39/151
stdevp  2.0654  4.1330  0.2085  0.5611
sd(mean)  0.1675  0.3352  0.0169  0.0455
(6)  Japan-Italy
mean  0.8647  -0.2804  0.2611  1.8127  20/120
stdevp  1.7417  3.4519  0.1857  0.6060
sd(mean)  0.1590  0.3151  0.0170  0.0553
(7) Japan-France
mean  0.6130  -0.1992  0.2632  1.8960  28/132
stdevp  1.9980  3.7585  0.2205  0.6016
sd(mean)  0.1739  0.3271  0.0192  0.0524
(8) Janan-UK
mean  0.8724  -0.0022  0.2995  1.8045  41/142
stdevp  1.8584  3.7194  0.2129  0.6118
sd(mean)  0.1560  0.3121  0.0179  0.0513
aColumn  of statistics  are for coefficients  of these  variables.
"  'This column  shows  the number  of regressions  which are  significant  at 95% for each  country  pair examined.
35Table 2 Parameter  estimates from combined samples (1980-1993)*
(A)  (B)
In (In/  e)  *  j  R-square  F-value  hin-  Il (In  7a)'*  R-square  F-value
(nv / e)*  cu  *(vve)*  (U
U.S.-UK  0.4084  0.4787  0.0328  37.4  U.S.-UK  0.1499  0.4102  0.486  0.0328  24.9
(0.05147)  (0.12353)  (0.8527)  (0.0525)  (0.1238)
U.S.-Germany  0.7302  0.0554  0.1399  181.2  U.S.-Germany  1.2258  0.7423  0.0611  0.1408  121.7
(0.0385)  (0.0806)  (0.7788)  (0.0392)  (0.0833)
U.S.-Italy  0.6927  0.291  0.1307  152.2  U.S.-Italy  0.7967  0.6948  0.2856  0.1313  101.9
(0.0402)  (0.0669)  (0.6968)  (0.0402)  (0.0671)
U.S.-France  0.8097  0.1442  0.1109  117.2  U.S.-France  0.8817  0.8218  0.1523  0.1115  78.5
(0.0529)  (0.0751)  (0.8)  (0.0541)  (0.0754)
Japan-UK  0.8937  0.2332  0.1161  139.3  Japan-UK  -0.286  0.8944  0.2375  0.1162  92.9
(0.0585)  (0.1257)  (0.799)  (0.0586)  (0.1263)
Japan-Germany  0.6798  -0.0337  0.0853  99.9  Japan-Germany  0.4553  0.6778  -0.0316  0.0855  66.7
(0.0571)  (0.0759)  (0.633)  (0.0571)  (0.076)
Japan-Italy  0.74773  0.0571  0.0765  80.5  Japan-ltaly  -0.1394  0.7471  0.0581  0.0765  53.7
(0.0644)  (0.0489)  (0.5807)  (0.0645)  (0.0491)
Japan-France  0.62193  -0.1595  0.0588  56.1  Japan-France  -0.2515  0.6242  -0.1625  0.0589  37.4
(0.0638)  (0.0743)  (0.679)  (0.0642)  (0.0748)
*All estimates  are corrected  for cross-commodity  heteroscedasticity  and  all variables  are  taken  from deviations  rom means.
"Column of statistics  are  for coefficients  of these  variables. Parenthesis  below  are  standard  errors.
36Table 3 Parameter  estimates  from combined  samples  (1980-1993)*  Observations  as three-year  averages
(A)  (B)
i  (mv  / e)  *  In-CU  I  I  (v  / e)  - In  ,  F-value
(iw/e)*  cu*  R-square  F-value  In  i  (nv/  e)  CU*  R-square
U.S.-UK  0.3814  0.5185  0.0565  24.5  U.S.-UK  0.0178  0.3817  0.5184  0.0565  16.3
(0.0596)  (0.1376)  (0.8202)  (0.061)  (0.1379)
U.S.-Germany  0.6652  -0.1637  0.2495  136.8  U.S.-Germany  0.3505  0.6679  -0.1643  0.2497  91.2
(0.0436)  (0.0792)  (0.7109)  (0.044)  (0.0792)
U.S.-Italy  0.5931  0.2815  0.2061  99.4  U.S.-ltaly  -0.0337  0.593  0.282  0.2061  66.2
(0.0495)  (0.0698)  (0.535)  (0.0436)  (0.0712)
U.S.-France  0.8567  0.3878  0.2231  104.1  U.S.-France  1.123  0.8723  0.3813  0.2254  70.2
(0.0594)  (0.0722)  (0.7637)  (0.0603)  (0.07212)
Japan-UK  1.138  0.2062  0.3477  215.9  Japan-UK  0.1775  1.139  0.203  0.3477  143.7
(0.0603)  (0.0857)  (0.8152)  (0.0604)  (0.0869)
Japan-Germany  0.6622  0.0198  0.1575  76.1  Japan-Germany  0.5709  0.6599  0.0217  0.1583  50.9
(0.066)  (0.0745)  (0.6413)  (0.06609)  (0.0746)
Japan-Italy  0.8612  0.1947  0.2737  142.8  Japan-Italy  -0.6013  0.8593  0.2012  0.275  95.7
(0.0544)  (0.0354)  (0.5072)  (0.0544)  (0.03583)
Japan-France  0.5168  0.0833  0.4138  253.8  Japan-France  0.00858  0.5165  0.0835  0.4138  168.9
(0.0237)  (0.0725)  (0.7061)  (0.0368)  (0.0742)
*AII estimates  are corrected  for cross-commodity  heteroscedasticity  and all variables  are  taken  from deviations  from means.
"Column of statistics  are for coefficients  of these  variables. Parenthesis  below  are standard  errors.
37Table 4 Parameter estimates from combined samples (1980-1993)*
U.S. and Japan  vs. weighted average  of EC-4
(A)  (B)
~(rwIe)  1 ~CU  Tn- 1 -'  in  (nvre)  .nCU
In  a  In  R-square  F-value  In-  n  In  R-square  F-value
(rw /e)*  CU*  T*  (rw /e)*  CU
U.S.-EC4  0.771  0.286  0.1825  187.8  U.S.-EC4  0.723  0.772  0.307  0.1836  126.1
(0.0399)  (0.0956)  (0.4708)  (0.0399)  (0.0965)
Japan-EC4  0.625  -0.138  0.0728  64.5  Japan-EC4  -0.266  0.623  -0.1412  0.073  43.2
(0.0582)  (0.0681)  (0.376)  (0.0583)  (0.0682)
Table 5  Parameter  estimates from combined samples (1980-1993)
Observations as three-year averages*
U.S. and Japan  vs. weighted average  of EC-4
(A)  (B)
l  (rw/e)  l  cu  R-square  F-value  In-  I(z  / e)  In  R-square  F-value
(rw  /e)*  CU  *  r  (nv  /e)*  CU
U.S.-EC4  0.676  0.327  0.2084  86.6  U.S.-EC4  0.677  0.678  0.343  0.2103  58.3
(0.0528)  (0.102)  (0.548)  (0.0528)  (0.103)
Japan-EC4  0.608  -0.0458  0.0809  29.1  Japan-EC4  0.174  0.609  -0.044  0.0811  19.4
(0.0885)  (0.0926)  (0.496)  (0.0886)  (0.0928)
*All estimates  are  corrected  for cross-commodity  heteroscedasticity  and all variables  are  taken  from deviations  from means.
"Column of statistics  of the coefficients  of these  variables. Parenthesis  below  are  standard  errors.
38Appendix  Parameter estimates  from combined  samples  (1970-1993)*
(A)  (B)
n (zw/e)  *  n CU  R-square  F-value  hi- (  )  '  - R-square  F-value
(rw /e)*  CU  (,zwve)*  cru
U.S.-UK  0.3517  0.2986  0.0176  33.8  U.S.-UK  -0.635  0.335  0.317  0.018  23.1
(0.0428)  (0.0564)  (0.516)  (0.0449)  (0.0584)
U.S.-Germany  0.555  0.4856  0.0639  130.4  U.S.-Germany  3.382  0.682  0.362  0.076  104.9
(0.0385)  (0.0563)  (0.4754)  (0.0387)  (0.0586)
U.S.-Italy  0.2474  0.237  0.0158  28.6  U.S.-Italy  4.518  0.408  0.181  0.0451  56.0
(0.0339)  (0.051)  (0.432)  (0.0368)  (0.0502)
U.S.-France  0.391  0.226  0.0327  58.3  U.S.-France  3.178  0.555  0.2202  0.0439  52.8
(0.0386)  (0.0368)  (0.499)  (0.0462)  (0.0366)
Japan-UK  0.624  0.133  0.0751  142.3  Japan-UK  -1.074  0.67  0.165  0.076  96.1
(0.0471)  (0.052)  (0.573)  (0.0531)  (0.0577)
Japan-Germany  0.6951  0.015  0.1487  309.2  Japan-Germany  0.286  0.683  0.0137  0.149  206.2
(0.0383)  (0.0286)  (0.438)  (0.0425)  (0.0287)
Japan-Italy  0.981  -0.00026  0.185  375.3  Japan-Italy  2.0561  0.844  0.00026  0.1887  256.6
(0.0403)  (0.0244)  (0.5182)  (0.053)  (0.0244)
Japan-France  0.674  -0.0195  0.0938  163.3  Japan-France  2.162  0.572  -0.016  0.0984  114.8
(0.0416)  (0.0292)  (0.5347)  (0.0485)  (0.0292)
*AII estimates are corrected for cross-commodity heteroscedasticity  and all variables are taken from deviations from means.
aColumn of statistics are for coefficients of these variables.  Parenthesis below are standard errors.
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